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The Rise and Fall of Enron: A White House Nondisclosure
Entangles Separation of Powers and Contempt of Congress
L. Darnell Weeden*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article addresses whether President George W. Bush may refuse to
adequately provide the Comptroller General with information about Enron's role
in developing America's energy policy with a universal implicit or express
assertion of executive privilege without being held in contempt of Congress
under the separation of powers doctrine. The Comptroller General, an officer of
the federal legislative branch, is asserting legal authority to compel the Bush
Administration to disclose information about Enron's role in shaping our national
energy policy.' The General Accounting Office (GAO) believes that it has a right
to access information about who met with Vice President Dick Cheney's task
force in 2001 and what was discussed in those meetings 2 under its power to
"investigate all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public
money."3 In 2002, congressional investigators sued the White House in federal
district court for the first time in history in an effort to force Vice President
Cheney to disclose information about his energy task force's meetings with
business executives from Enron, a bankrupt Houston corporation, and other
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I. GAO Sues to Force Cheney to List Names; Role of Enron and Others in National Policy at Issue, THE
COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Feb. 23, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 3463730.
The investigative arm of Congress filed suit Friday against the Bush [A]dministration, an
unprecedented legal action growing out of a [ten]-month standoff between the executive and
legislative branches of government. The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Washington, was
named [Walker v. Cheney]. David Walker is U.S. Comptroller General and head of the General
Accounting Office of Congress. Dick Cheney is the Vice President and head of the
administration's interagency energy task force, the focus of the litigation. The GAO is seeking a
court order to force Cheney to reveal the names of those he met with as the task force was
forming national energy policy.
Id.
2. Id.
3. 31 U.S.C.A. § 712(1) (West 1993).
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energy companies.4 White House spokesperson Anne Womack stated that the
Bush Administration is "ready to fight" for its constitutional right not to disclose
the information to the GAO. 5 Womack asserted that the White House "look[s]
forward to having the court review it" because it has a legal right not to comply
with the GAO's request for information.
6
Although for more than eighty years it has been difficult to define a proper
separation of powers relationship between the GAO (a congressional watchdog
agency) and the White House, the struggle between the two intensified on
February 22, 2002 after GAO lawyers filed an unprecedented suit in federal court
against the executive branch.7 "In its first lawsuit against the executive branch,
the GAO said it has a legal right to know who attended meetings of Cheney's
National Energy Policy Development Group." 8 In May 2001, Cheney refused to
provide the GAO with the names of those attending the meeting, asserting that
4. Patty Reinert, The Fall of Enron, GAO Sues White House, Demands Cheney Divulge Information on
Meetings, HOUST. CHRON., Feb. 23, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 3243865.
5. Id.
6. Id.
The GAO contends that the information is necessary to make the executive branch accountable
to Congress and to the public for how it spends taxpayers' money. The GAO, prompted by
complaints from environmentalists who felt left out of the meetings, as well as from several
Democratic lawmakers, has been seeking records since last spring. The office originally sought
notes and minutes, but scaled back its request last August, telling the White House it wanted the
names of participants in the task force meetings, the dates and locations of the meetings, the
subject matter discussed and the cost. Two environmental groups and Judicial Watch, a
Washington-based government watchdog, have filed separate lawsuits against the White House
seeking the same information. Cheney and Bush have refused to turn over the information,
arguing that the president and vice president should be free to seek confidential advice from
outside parties. The White House also argues that the GAO has overstepped its authority by
demanding the information. The GAO put off the legal action after the Sept. II terrorist attacks.
But the issue has taken on more urgency since Enron, Bush's largest campaign contributor, filed
for bankruptcy on Dec. 2 [,200 1]. The company's collapse has sparked numerous investigations
over its questionable business deals and accounting practices as well as its political influence.
Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., and Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., requested the GAO probe.
Waxman, who has made headlines recently by releasing an almost constant stream of documents
related to the various Enron investigations, says he found [seventeen] provisions in the
administration's final energy policy that were either advocated by Enron or benefited the
company. Cheney, himself a former energy services company executive, has said the task force
accepted some industry recommendations but also rejected some. He denies that the task force
was improperly influenced by big business or by wealthy campaign contributors. The vice
president acknowledges that he or his staff met with Enron executives six times last year and
that at one of those meetings, then-Enron Chairman Ken Lay handed Cheney a memo with
several suggestions that ended up in the administration's energy policy.
Id.
7. David G. Savage, GAO Sues to Open Cheney Energy Records, White House Promises to Fight Policy
Disclosure, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 23, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 3797186; Edward R.
Murray, Note, Beyond Bowsher: The Comptroller General's Account Settlement Authority and Separation of
Powers, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1999). In his note, Murray describes a battle between the Department of
Justice and the Comptroller General regarding how to settle federal accounts as a feud that has existed since the
1920s. Murray, supra note 7.
8. Savage, supra note 7.
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such disclosure would "intrude into the heart of executive deliberations."9 The
GAO believes that President Bush and Cheney are resisting its request for documents
because Enron's "spectacular collapse" may be politically embarrassing to the
White House because of its "close ties" to Enron. l0
One newspaper editorial rejects the White House's attempts "to portray its
standoff with Congress" and the GAO as preserving "the powers of the presidency"
by insisting that Congress honor separation of powers principles.11 The editorial
depicts the White House as refusing to disclose "who helped Vice President Dick
Cheney write the administration's energy plan" for reasons independent of any
separation of powers goal.12 The White House's stonewalling battle with Congress
and the GAO is fueled by a desire to put political separation between itself and
Enron because "[t]he White House... may end up embarrassed by the extent of
its ties to oil and gas interests" and former Enron Chief Executive Officer,
Kenneth Lay.
13
The Walker v. Cheney14 litigation set the stage for "a legal showdown" between
the GAO and the executive branch, of which Vice President Cheney is a member,
"over access to records of the national energy task force" over which Cheney
presides.' 5 President Bush and Cheney refused Republican advice to disclose the
requested documents to the GAO even after the denial of the request became
"politically perilous" on account of Enron's bankruptcy problems. Bush and
Cheney believe "that the confidentiality of executive branch discussions [is]
worth fighting for."' 6 1 agree with the discerning observation made by Professors
John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda that "the Nixon decision leaves open how the
Court would weight a generalized [presidential] interest in confidentiality with
the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation or in a congressional hearing. 1 7
This article analyzes what separation of powers deference, if any, a court
should give to a broad assertion of executive privilege by the executive branch
when Congress seeks access to information in the possession of either the
President or Vice President of the United States. Part II provides background for
the separation of powers theory, and describes it as an attempt to prevent the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government from
9. Id.
10. Id.




14. 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) (Mem.) (stating that "fundamental separation of powers
concerns relating to the restricted role of the Article II courts in our constitutional system of government ordain
the outcome here."). This article deliberately does not address the issue of standing to sue; rather, it considers
the merits of a claim of executive privilege over the threat of contempt of Congress.
15. Don Van Natta Jr., Cheney Sued on Energy Panel, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 23, 2002, at 1, available at
2002 WL 6541756.
16. Id.
17. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 263 (6th ed. 2000).
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becoming too powerful by giving each branch formal assigned responsibilities
that may not be encroached upon by the other branches. Part III advances the
theory that a court's rejection of executive privilege for generic, confidential
presidential communications appears to be rooted in a functional application of
the separation of powers doctrine, which is firmly established on a lack of inter-
branch impairment. Part IV of this article argues how the congressional power of
contempt is implicated when the White House refuses to adequately disclose
subpoenaed generic, confidential presidential communications. Part V discusses
the implications of the holding in Jones v. Clinton18 and its presidential contempt
rationale for sitting presidents facing a congressional subpoena. Part VI discusses
the legal-political tension created under the separation of powers model by
congressional or executive investigations that implicate the President's privilege
not to disclose information.19 Part VII concludes with a brief recommendation that
the President should avoid asserting executive privilege in order to deny
disclosure of information to Congress unless the President specifically articulates
how the disclosure would impair the President's executive power.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY
The problem with the actual application of the separation of powers theory in the
real political world of our nation's capital is that it does not lend itself to any formal
bright-line rules because Congress and the President have overlapping roles shaped
more by function than constitutional structure. One commentator states that the
elusive separation of powers doctrine appears to "require classification of functions
and agents as belonging to one of the three branches" which represents a formalistic
approach to the separation of powers doctrine.2 ° The commentator correctly proposes
18. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
19. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 699-700 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The present case began when the Legislative and Executive Branches became "embroiled in a
dispute concerning the scope of the congressional investigatory power," United States v. House
of Representatives of United States, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (DC 1983), which-as is often the
case with such interbranch conflicts-became quite acrimonious. In the course of oversight
hearings into the administration of the Superfund by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), two Subcommittees of the House of Representatives requested and then subpoenaed
numerous internal EPA documents. The President responded by personally directing the EPA
Administrator not to turn over certain of the documents, see Memorandum of November 30,
1982, from President Reagan for the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency,
reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 99-435, pp. 1166-1167 (1985), and by having the Attorney General
notify the congressional Subcommittees of this assertion of executive privilege, see Letters of
November 30, 1982, from Attorney General William French Smith to Hon. John D. Dingell
and Hon. Elliott H. Levitas, reprinted, id., at 1168-1177. In his decision to assert executive
privilege, the President was counseled by appellee Olson, who was then Assistant Attorney
General of the Department of Justice for the Office of Legal Counsel, a post that has
traditionally had responsibility for providing legal advice to the President (subject to approval
of the Attorney General).
Id.
20. Michael J. Wieser, Note, Beyond Bowsher: A Separation of Powers Approach to the Delegation of
Budgetary Authority, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 1405, 1436 (1990).
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that the formalistic approach to separation of powers analysis "be applied as a
rebuttable threshold test" so that a court may apply a functional balancing test to the
separation of powers issue.21 In an executive-legislative separation of powers case,
"[p]assing the formalistic threshold test should serve as a strong, yet rebuttable
presumption of constitutionality."
22
The Constitution established bright-line classifications of the specific powers
of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government
without any real guidelines, other than constitutional process, as to when the
executive branch encroaches on the power-base of the legislative branch. 23 At the
time the Constitution was adopted, the broad policy goal of separation of powers
advocates was to prohibit any branch of the federal government from having a
large concentration of power.24 The founding fathers believed that if any branch
of the federal government had too much power, that branch would place citizens'
liberties at risk.25 According to the Supreme Court, our system of separating
powers among the three branches of the federal government was structured to
create power conflicts and confusion about power in order "to provide avenues
for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power.,
26
It is not unusual for the executive branch to refuse to provide the legislative
branch with the information it requests under a claim of executive privilege. The
President sometimes denies requests for information from the federal legislative
branch, the federal judiciary, and officials within the executive branch based on
the theory of executive privilege. More than 135 years ago, in a case involving a
challenge by the State of Mississippi to the federal Reconstruction Acts, the
Supreme Court rejected the idea of an expansive form of executive privilege for
American presidents. 27 In that reconstruction-era case, the Supreme Court clearly
The formalistic labelling test devised in [Bowsher] is important in that it furnishes courts with a
consistent formula that embodies the essence of separation of powers. When one thinks of the
elusive theory of the separation of powers, the doctrine itself seems to require classification of
functions and agents as belonging to one of the three branches. The fact that the Constitution is
specific in enumerating particular responsibilities to particular branches supports the notion
that each branch has a unique role in respect to the other branches.
Id.
21. Id. at 1437.
22. Id.
23. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986).
24. Id. at 721-22.
25. Id.
The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of government, of course, was to
"[diffuse] power the better to secure liberty." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson's words echo the famous
warning of Montesquieu, quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that "'there can
be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body
of magistrates'...
Id.
26. Id. at 722.
27. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
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articulated the principle that the President is not above the law, is subject to legal
process, and must implement constitutional laws passed by Congress.
28
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
FOR GENERIC, CONFIDENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
APPEARS TO BE BASED ON A FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS BASED ON A LACK OF
INTER-BRANCH IMPAIRMENT
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,29 former President Richard M.
Nixon filed a lawsuit disputing the constitutional validity of the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act on a theory of executive privilege.
The Act instructed one of the President's executive officers, the Administrator of
General Services, to take custody of the presidential papers and tape recordings
of former President Nixon. In this civil case, the Court acknowledged that a
former President was entitled to executive privilege for certain confidential
presidential communications, but it then rejected Nixon's claim that the doctrine
of separation of powers and the need for confidentiality of high level
communications could justify "an absolute, unqualified [p]residential privilege.,
31
The Court rejected the idea that a president could assert a "broad, undifferentiated
claim" of confidential communications based on executive privilege. The Court
properly rejected Nixon's claim for executive privilege because his assertion of power
failed the separation of powers functional impairment requirement. In deciding whether
requests to a president for disclosure of information upset the balance of power
between the legislative and the executive branches, one must consider whether the
28. Id. at 478-79.
The President is but the creature of the Constitution, one of the agencies created by it to carry it
into practical operation; and it would be strange if he should be permitted to exert his agency in
violating that instrument, and then claim exemption from the process of the court whose duty it
is to guard it against abuses, because he is the chief executive officer of the government, and
especially when he is exerting a mere ministerial duty; for that is all he does exert in executing
an act of Congress; he has no discretion in the matter. The Constitution makes no distinction as
to parties. The case is the criterion, no matter who is plaintiff or who defendant; and if the
President be exempt from the process of the law, he is above the law. On the trial of Aaron
Burr, an application was made for a subpoena duces tecum, to be directed to the President of
the United States; and the application was resisted on the ground that the President was not
amenable to the process of the court, and could not be drawn from the discharge of his duties at
the seat of government, and made to attend the court sitting at Richmond. But Chief Justice
Marshall, who tried the case, drew the distinction between the President and the King of
England, and held that all officers in this country were subordinate to the law, and must obey
its mandate, and, therefore, sustained the application.
Id.
29. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 446.
32. Id. at 447.
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disclosure would significantly impair the executive branch's ability to achieve its
constitutionally assigned functions.33
Professor Victoria Nourse, a critic of the functional approach to the separation of
powers theory, correctly observes that "when the Supreme Court uses a
functionalist approach, it asks whether the challenged practice undermines an
existing departmental function., 34 Professor Nourse believes that our normal
comprehension of the separation of powers doctrine as a product of function
should be rejected.35 Professor Nourse maintains that function alone "serves as a
poor proxy for" deciding separation of powers issues.36
However, Professor Nourse's characterization of the functional approach as
failing to understand the implications of political relationships for governmental
structure is questionable. 37 Professor Nourse's narrow function rationale is
unconvincing because the function concept is a constitutionally permissible,
pragmatic, structural, and judicial accommodation of the political practices of the
federal executive and judicial structures of government.38  "While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government., 39 I
believe the "practice" Justice Jackson refers to strongly implies that a workable
government will depend on a functional accommodation of both the structural and
political realities inherent in the separation of powers theory.40 According to Justice
Jackson, the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress. 41 The politically sensitive statesmen who crafted our Constitution did not
intend for their flexible, functional and structural approach to separation of powers
to result in a disregard of practical political realities.42
33. Id. at 443.
34. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 756 (1999).
35. Id. at 749.
36. Id.
37. Id.




42 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 748-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white." Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in
politics, who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But
they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). As Justice Brandeis, explained in his dissent in
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926): "The separation of the powers of government
did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, dependent
upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature
executive, legislative and judicial."
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As the foregoing illustrates, President Bush and Vice President Cheney's theory
of executive privilege for general communications about America's national
energy policy asserted against the GAO is an uphill battle at best. Bush's White
House faces an escalating battle because of the broad range of Congress's
investigative power43 and the fairly limited scope of a qualified executive privilege,
which requires the executive branch to articulate a necessity to safeguard "military,
diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets."
44
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER OF CONTEMPT IS IMPLICATED WHEN THE
WHITE HOUSE REFUSES TO ADEQUATELY DISCLOSE SUBPOENAED
GENERIC, CONFIDENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
In a 1957 case involving a witness who testified in response to a subpoena
issued by a congressional committee, the Supreme Court held that Congress had
comprehensive power to investigate, including the power to study drawbacks in
our political system in search of a cure.45 When Congress or its agent, the GAO,
investigates a matter, "[i]t is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to
cooperate, 46 with that investigation. It appears that the White House is beginning
to realize that President Bush, as an American citizen, is obligated to cooperate
with Congress in its investigation into the nature of Enron's contact with the
President's executive office.4 7 Responding to a Senate subpoena, presidential
counsel, Alberto Gonzales, ordered all employees in the White House's executive
office to provide the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (Senate Committee)
with "any official documents related to contacts with Enron officials. '48 The
Senate Committee began pursuing information from the White House in
43. John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of
Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 489, 561 (2001) (citing Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)). "Congress's undoubted power to oversee the operations of the executive branch and to
investigate its programs to determine whether statutory changes may be necessary makes any such strict separation
of functions unrealistic." Id. at 561-62.
44. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). "The President's need for complete candor and
objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely
on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a
confrontation with other values arises." Id.
45. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
We start with several basic premises on which there is general agreement. The power of the
Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It
encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political
system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.
Id.
46. Id.
47. Marcy Gordon, Top Bush Aide Orders Handover of Enron Data, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2002, at 12,
available at 2002 WL 2658608.
48. Id.
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March 2002 as part of its Enron investigation. The Senate Committee issued
subpoenas to the offices of President Bush and Vice President Cheney to produce
particular documents.49 Shortly thereafter, the White House furnished the Senate
Committee with summaries of dozens of contacts between Bush Administration
officials and Enron executives. ° The Senate Committee's chairperson, Senator
Joseph Lieberman, expressed the opinion that the provided materials fell short of
the documents requested by subpoena.
5 1
One interesting question presented in this battle between Congress and the
White House about relevant Enron documents is whether Congress could use its
contempt powers against the White House if the White House refuses to adequately
honor a subpoena requesting documents from a congressional committee. Under
federal law, a person who refuses to provide Congress with requested documents
may be found in contempt of Congress and charged with committing a misdemeanor
crime.
52
Let us suppose that the White House refuses to fully comply with the Senate
subpoena. The White House has not actually given possession of the materials to the
Senate committee because of alleged concerns about the security of the documents.
53
The documents contain "sensitive information" according to the White House.54 The
President's lawyer, Alberto Gonzales, has taken the position that the Senate
Committee will not actually receive possession of the documents until after the
White House and the Senate Committee agree "on procedures to safeguard the
security and confidentiality of these documents. 55 Because the Senate Committee
does not have possession of the documents, its staff must go to the White House to
inspect and review more than 2,100 pages of documents connected to White House
communications with Enron officials.56
Allow me to present a hypothetical. Let us assume that after reviewing more




52. 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 (West 2002) (refusal of witness to testify or produce papers).
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of
Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either
House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses
of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than [one thousand
dollars] nor less than [one hundred dollars] and imprisonment in a common jail for not less
than one month nor more than twelve months.
Id.
53. Marcy Gordon, Senate Gets Enron Documents: The Partial Release of White House Papers is Part
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Committee concludes that it has adequate procedures in place to protect the
sensitive information identified in the documents and requests possession of the
documents to assist in its investigation. Under my hypothetical, the White House
refuses to give the Senate Committee possession of these sensitive materials
because it believes the Senate Committee's procedural safeguards are inadequate.
In this hypothetical, the sensitive materials include: "Social Security numbers, e-
mail addresses of government officials, communications among government
employees regarding policy and foreign relations, and confidential business
information. 57 Under this hypothetical, may the Senate find the White House in
contempt for failure to provide it with possession of the subpoenaed materials
under the Necessary and Proper Clause?58 I believe one could make a strong
argument that the Senate could find the White House in contempt in a non-criminal
matter for refusal to hand over the requested materials to the Senate Committee
under the rationale of Anderson v. Dunn,59 decided in 1821-almost two hundred
years ago.
In Dunn, the plaintiff, John Anderson, sued the defendant, Thomas Dunn,
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress,
on a theory of trespass 60 for an assault and battery, and false imprisonment. 61 The
House of Representatives found Anderson guilty of contempt because he had
breached the "dignity and authority" 62 of the House, and issued a warrant for his
arrest.63 Based on a House Resolution, Henry Clay, Speaker of the House, ordered
Dunn to place Anderson under custodial arrest and bring him before the House to
answer the contempt charges against him.64 Dunn obeyed the House's commands,
took the plaintiff Anderson into custody, and brought him before the House.6 5
Anderson, who was not a member of Congress, appeared before the House and was
found guilty of contempt because of the "outrage" he had caused.66 During his
appearance, Anderson was reprimanded by Clay for his behavior and then "forthwith
discharged from the custody" of Dunn.67 The Supreme Court ruled against Anderson
57. Id.
58. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof" Id.
59. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
60. "In practice a form of action, at the common law which lies for redress in the shape of money
damages for any unlawful injury done to the plaintiff, in respect to either his person, property, or rights, by the
immediate force and violence of the defendant." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1674 (4th ed. 1968).
61. 19 U.S. at 204.
62. Id. at 209.
63. Id. at 209-10.
64. Id. at 208-10.
65. Id. at 210.
66. Id. at 212. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
67. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 212.
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in his trespass action opposing the House because Congress has an implied necessary
power to penalize people who are not members for contempt of Congress.6"
In Dunn, the Supreme Court granted Congress the expansive power to find
individuals who are not members of Congress in contempt under a rather
charitable interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution.6 9
The Court initially stated that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress
to carry out the powers expressly given.70 The Court then stated that the
Necessary and Proper Clause also allows Congress to exercise its contempt
power as a necessary incident of its legislative judicial power.71 In Dunn, the
parties agreed "that the only question before the Court was, whether the House of
Representatives could exercise the power in question, either as incidental to its
legislative, or its judicial capacity."
72
The Supreme Court has specifically stated that the Constitution provides both
branches of Congress certain judicial functions.73 The Court describes the House of
Representatives's power of impeachment as a judicial function because it includes
the power to require the presence of witnesses and to hold them in contempt if
necessary.74 The Court appears to have used the discussion of the House's
impeachment power to conclude that Congress may find a person in contempt as a
necessary incident of its judicial capacity when Congress's principal role in the
process is deliberative. 75 Hypothetically, the White House could be found in
contempt of Congress for failure to deliver actual possession of the subpoenaed
documents if the Senate Committee asserts that possession is "necessary" to its
investigation of Enron. In Dunn, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the
68. Id. at 213-16.
69. Id. at 219; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
70. Dunn, 19 U.S. at 213.
71. Id. at 215-24.
72. Id. at 218.
73. Id. at 219.
74. Id.
Even Lord Holt, who was an enemy of the extravagant privileges of Parliament, admits that the
power of impeachment residing in the House of Commons, necessarily involved the authority
of committing the accused, and of punishing contempts. The powers of judging of elections,
and of punishing members for disorderly conduct, necessarily involves all the incidents of
judicature.
Id. at 219-20 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 220-21.
And the general grant of judicial powers to the Courts of the United States, does not exclude
the other branches of the government from the exercise of certain portions of judicial authority.
The different departments of the government could not be divided in this exact, artificial
manner. They all run into each other. Even the President, though his functions are principally
executive, has a portion of legislative power; and the Congress is invested with certain portions
ofjudicial power.
Id.
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contention that allowing Congress to have contempt power based on an assertion of
legislative necessity is too broad and indefinite and subject to abuse.76
If the White House fails to adequately provide Congress with the Enron
materials requested in the subpoena, it runs a serious risk of being held in
contempt of Congress for impairing Congress's ability to investigate Enron in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 77 According to the Supreme Court,
the contempt power of Congress "exists as one necessary to enable either House
of Congress to exercise successfully their function of legislation."
78
In Kilbourn v. Thompson,79 the House of Representatives held the plaintiff in
contempt of Congress because the plaintiff failed to respond to questions and
produce documents requested by a congressional subpoena concerning the status
of the United States government as a creditor of Jay Cooke & Co., a bankrupt
debtor.80 The plaintiff received a forty-five-day jail sentence from the House of
Representatives. 8' The Supreme Court held that it was improper for the House to
find the plaintiff in contempt and held "that the House of Representatives not
only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed" 82 the authority of the
judicial branch in violation of the separation of powers principle.
83
The Court held that the contempt order was void because it was issued to
assist in a non-legislative, congressional investigation about whether the creditor
Jay Cooke & Co. entered into a settlement agreement in a bankruptcy proceeding
pending before a federal district court without adequately securing its creditors.
84
Allowing Congress to investigate an issue while the same issue was being litigated in
a federal court created a situation where Congress was using its contempt power to
unconstitutionally intrude upon a federal court's judicial power. Such action by
Congress was a violation of the separation of powers theory.85 Although the Court
held that Congress did not properly exercise its contempt power against the plaintiff
because Congress was inappropriately conducting a judicial investigation, Professor
Neil Kinkopf believes that Kilbourn stands for the proposition that Congress has
expansive "investigative and oversight jurisdiction. 86
It is conceded that the Bush Administration will probably cooperate fully
with Congress's Enron investigation, but the White House, according to Senator
Lieberman, has not yet manifested a spirit of complete cooperation with the
76. 19 U.S. at 228.
77. Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880).
78. Id. at 189.
79. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
80. Id. at 189.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 192.
83. Id. at 192-93.
84. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 195-96.
85. Id. at 193.
86. Neil Kinkopf, Executive Privilege: The Clinton Administration in the Courts, 8 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 631, 652 (2000).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
Senate Committee.87 Lieberman strongly suggested that it was necessary for the
White House to provide the Senate Committee with all of the subpoenaed
documents "soon so it can complete its Enron investigation." 88 As the Bush
Administration engages in political posturing with Congress about its
investigation of Enron, the White House would be wise to remember Professor
Kinkopf s warning that Congress is not bashful about using its huge investigative
authority.89 In fact, Congress has a long tradition of expressing an eagerness to
use its investigative powers.90 I have concluded that Congress is eagerly using its
investigative authority today because it "has [eleven] committees and subcommittees
probing elements of the Enron failure."91 Based on relevant Supreme Court
precedents, if the White House fails to adequately provide any of these eleven
congressional committees with subpoenaed documents or testimony, it assumes
the risk of being held in contempt of Congress.
92
87. Hand Over Rest of Records, Senator Asks, HOUS. CHRON., June 11, 2002, at 3, available at 2002
WL 3269481. "The head of a Senate panel that has received some 2,500 pages of documents under subpoena
from the White House wants to know when it will deliver the rest of the records regarding contacts with Enron
officials." Id.
88. Id. "Under protest, the White House last Tuesday gave the committee more than 2,100 pages of
documents-,745 pages from Bush's office and 432 documents from Cheney's-under twin subpoenas issued
by the Democratic-controlled panel on May 22. Another [four hundred] pages or so came from Bush's office on
Friday." Id.
89. Kinkopf, supra note 86, at 652.
90. Thomas V. DiBacco, Congressional Investigations Continue American Tradition, WASH. TIMES
(D.C.), Jan. 22, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL 2903217.
It's a Capitol Hill rite of passage older than the Constitution: The first of many congressional
investigations for this year-this one concerning the collapse and political ties of Enron
Corporation-will take place Thursday [January 24, 20021. During the American Revolution,
the investigating committee arose as the Continental Congress, the nation's governing body,
tried to deal with its numerous problems both before and after the formal break with Great
Britain. Of major interest to the Continental Congress was the military campaign of the war,
with the first investigating committee dispatched to General George Washington's camp near
Boston. Leaving Philadelphia on Oct. 4, 1775, the committee of three, which included
Benjamin Franklin, arrived at Washington's headquarters [eleven] days later. They spent [ten]
days interviewing numerous officials and returned home with a report to the Continental
Congress, which agreed with its recommendation to increase military forces and pay.
Id.
91. Gina Holland, Enron Immunity Could Be Costly, AP ONLINE, Jan. 26, 2002, available at 2002 WL
10035907.
92. My opinion is based on Dunn and Kilbourn. Professor Kinkopf's commentary about Congress's
ability to use its broad legislative authority to invoke its contempt power also tends to support my conclusion.
Kinkopf, supra note 86. However, Jack Chaney argues that Congress has no power to censure the President
because censure is a form of punishment and he concludes that the President may only be punished by Congress
through impeachment under the separation of powers concept. Jack Chaney, Note, The Constitutionality of
Censuring the President, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 1004-05 (2000). Under Chaney's analysis, to the extent that the
contempt of Congress power is viewed as the power to punish, Congress should not find the White House in
contempt.
Congress is expressly granted the plenary power to "punish its Members for disorderly
Behav[ior], and with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." The bifurcated power of
impeachment in the House and trial in the Senate also grants Congress the power to expel a
President. However, the absence in the Constitution of a corresponding power to "punish [the
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V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE JONES V. CLINTON PRESIDENTIAL CONTEMPT
RATIONALE FOR SITTING PRESIDENTS
In 1999, a federal district court in Arkansas held that the President of the
United States could be found in civil contempt of court for giving false testimony
in a deposition. 93 One commentator suggests that the Supreme Court has allowed
Congress to play a paramount role in establishing its own rules of contempt when
performing a legislative investigation without any unnecessary impediment from
94either the judicial or executive branches. In Dunn, the Supreme Court was
unequivocal in stating that "[t]he rights of Congress on the subject of contempts,
have been considered similar, and equal to those of the federal Courts." 95 The
rationale of Dunn strongly supports the conclusion that Congress, when
exercising its legislative power, may find the President in contempt of Congress
96as an incident of the power necessary to investigate for legislative purposes.
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress, like the federal courts, should be
given as a matter of necessity enough authority to punish with contempt those
who would ignore its subpoena power.97 Will the legislative dignity of Congress
as an equal partner in the federal government be preserved if the President is
allowed to ignore congressional contempt powers in a manner that would not be
tolerated by a federal court?98
In Jones v. Clinton, the federal district court correctly held that there was "no
constitutional barrier to holding the President in civil contempt of court"
resulting in a fine. 99 "This lawsuit involved private actions allegedly taken by the
President before his term of office began, and the contumacious conduct on the
President] for disorderly behavior" provides a negative implication that the power is not
intended.
The interpretive maxim "expressio ... unius est exclusio alterius" means "inclusion of one
thing indicates exclusion of the other." Relative to the power to censure a President, the maxim
suggests that the power was not meant to exist. This conclusion is strengthened by the Supreme
Court's holding in [Kilbourn v. Thompson].
Id.
93. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
94. Joseph R. Thysell, Senate Rule XI and the Impeachment of Federal Judges, 29 S.U. L. REv. 77, 81
(2001) (citing Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881)).




At common law, the power to punish contempt is incident to Courts. But "Congress," and the
"House of Representatives," being terms unknown to the common law, can derive no claims
through it. Courts enforce the laws; they must, therefore, be clothed with authority to compel
obedience to them: whereas, the Legislature is merely deliberative. But, it is asked, are the
members to be insulted with impunity, in a manner which will not authorize the interference
of a Court?
Id.
99. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
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part of the President was undertaken in his role as a litigant in a civil case and did
not relate to his duties as President."' 00 Unlike President Clinton, the Bush
Administration can assert that, because it was acting in its official executive
capacity when meeting with Enron officials and others about our national energy
policy, the Jones v. Clinton rationale does not allow Congress to hold it in
contempt for lack of full disclosure. However, the mere fact that Bush's White
House was acting in its official capacity should not save it from Congress's
contempt powers if less than full disclosure of the Enron-related documents
impairs Congress's ability to conduct a meaningful investigation. In prior
decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the judicial branch may place a
significant burden on the executive branch while the judiciary reviews its official
conduct without violating the separation of powers concept. 01 Congress, like the
judiciary, should be able to burden the President with its subpoena powers
without a per se violation of the separation of powers doctrine. In Jones v.
Clinton, the federal court of appeals rejected the argument that when the federal
judiciary directs litigation involving the President, it will inherently impair the
role of the executive branch.1
0 2
A congressional investigation into the official meetings between Enron and
the White House does not necessarily impair the function of the executive
branch. Because of the rationale of Dunn-legislative contempt is based on
necessity of self-survival similar to judicial contempt-Vice President Cheney
could be found in contempt for impairing a congressional investigation by not
adequately disclosing documents. In order to escape the contempt power of
Congress, the White House is required to articulate an appropriate presidential
impairment justification. The President's interest in privacy or confidentiality is not
enough.103 The White House must meet its burden of "detailing any specific
responsibilities or explaining how or the degree to which [presidential duties] are
affected by"' 0 4 a full disclosure of the subpoenaed documents.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1124-25 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705 (1997), as quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982)). "If the judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the
legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it
must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct." Id.
102. 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 (8th Cir. 1996).
Mr. Clinton argues that denying his claim to immunity will give the judiciary carte blanche to
intrude unconstitutionally upon the Executive Branch and in fact will disrupt the performance
of his presidential duties and responsibilities. As the argument goes, because a federal court
will control the litigation, the Third Branch necessarily will interfere with the Executive
Branch through the court's scheduling orders and its powers to issue contempt citations and
sanctions.
Id.
103. See id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) "holding no presidential privilege
attaches to presidential communications subpoenaed in criminal case when asserted privilege 'is based only on
the generalized interest in confidentiality').
104. Id.
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One newspaper reporter describes the Bush Administration's mishandling of
the Senate Committee's request for Enron documents as "echoes of the Clinton era
reverberating around the White House."10 5 The writer appropriately analogizes to
the Clinton era because the Bush White House has created an unintended
impression that it has something to hide by allowing Enron to serve as a major
player in the dialogue about our national energy policy. 10 6 Senator Lieberman's
committee goal is to examine the nature of the White House's connection with
Enron.10 7 One has to wonder whether the President's legal counsel adequately
appreciates that "[i]gnoring the subpoena, issued by the Senate governmental
affairs committee, could lead to contempt of Congress charges against the White
House."1
08
Starting in April 2001, the Bush Administration declined to publish the names
of energy industry representatives who convened with members of Vice President
Cheney's task force to formulate a far-reaching approach to our national energy
policy. 0 9 Since that time, the White House has continually attempted to avoid
court-ordered disclosure of information about energy issues even to the extent of
challenging the entrenched investigative privilege of the GAO." ° The Bush
Administration has generally been forced by actual or threatened legal process to
reveal information about its increasingly interesting connection to the energy
industry."' This cloak of secrecy by the White House has created the appearance
that is has something to hide from both Congress and the American public. 1
2
President Clinton's mishandling of a sexual harassment suit by Paula Jones
almost cost him his job as the President of the United States and resulted in
Clinton being the first President to be found in contempt of court while in
105. Nancy Dunne, The Americas-Administration Faces Test on Enron Subpoenas, FIN. TIMES, May
31, 2002, at Pl0, available at 2002 WL 21712509.
106. Id.
107. Id.
Four of the five main investigations on Enron centre on the industry's role in making energy
policy; the fifth, Mr. Lieberman's probe, addresses White House involvement with Enron.
The five investigations are not to be confused with probes under way by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Agency and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission into possible illegal







After the Natural Resources Defense Council, an environment group, filed a Freedom of
Information request for information about the task force, the administration failed to respond.
NRDC went to court. When a judge ordered the release of a document, the White House
turned over thousands of blank or heavily censored pages. Richard Nixon's Watergate
tapes-with their shocking 18.5-minute gap-seemed forthcoming by comparison.
Id.
112. Id.
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office.' 1 3 It is hoped that President Bush will not allow routine requests for
information about the Cheney task force's connection to Enron and the energy
industry cost the White House unnecessary legal-political woes1 14 because it
refused to properly cooperate with congressional investigations or the judicial
process.11 5 The Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental group, has
stated that Bush Administration officials engaged in 714 direct connections with
lobbyists for business interests about its energy blueprint, but only engaged in 29
direct connections with representatives from other segments of society." 6 More
than one hundred representatives involved in the energy business have met with
Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. 1 7 It may be politically embarrassing for the
White House to reveal information that demonstrates it is very intimate with
energy interests. However, being friendly with energy or environmental interests is
neither an impeachable offense nor a high crime or misdemeanor standing alone." 18
The White House may be assuming an unnecessary risk of a political backlash by not
fully cooperating with Congress's investigation of its ties to Enron." 9
On July 7, 2002, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
accused Enron's board of being instrumental in the company's downfall.120 "By
failing to provide sufficient oversight and restraint to stop management excess,
the Enron board contributed to the company's collapse and bears a share of the
responsibility."' 21 The Bush Administration would be wise to learn a lesson that
the Clinton Administration apparently never appreciated until after Clinton's
113. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (stating that "no court has ever held a President in
contempt of court.").
114. Dunne, supra note 105.
115. Id.
The administration has also rejected demands for minutes of meetings between the energy
task force and industry lobbyists. The requests were made by Judicial Watch, a conservative
legal group, and the Sierra Club, another environmental organisation, under an "open
meetings" law. A federal judge last week rejected administration attempts to get the case
dismissed, and cleared the way for collection of evidence and the taking of depositions.
Despite the administration's resistance, information has been trickling out. Most of the scant





118. See U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 4 (establishing that "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
119. H.R. REP. No. 107-383(1) (2002), available at 2002 WL 514737. During the Committee on
Education and the Workforce's first day of hearings regarding Enron, "Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao testified
about the steps the Department of Labor was taking to respond to Enron. In addition, she outlined changes the
Bush Administration felt were necessary to protect pension plan participants from future Enron situations." Id.
As a direct result of the Enron situation, the committee made a report on the Pension Security Act of 2002. Id.
120. Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Aims to Restore Confidence in Business- Wave of Scandals Spurs Push for
Reform in D.C., STAR-LEDGER (Newark), July 8, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 23261315.
121. Id.
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impeachment trial: it is better to resolve a potentially, politically embarrassing
situation with a spirit of cooperation as soon as possible rather than to engage in
creative legal and political tactics to avoid embarrassment which often lead to
uncalled-for legal-political risks. 1
22
Let us not forget that President Clinton was never found guilty of sexually
harassing Paula Jones. However, it was Clinton's failure to successfully negotiate
Jones's sexual harassment allegations that eventually led to his impeachment trial
and his being found in contempt of a federal court. 123 Jones initially indicated that
she wanted money or a job from President Clinton because of the incident.
124
Surely one of Clinton's advisors should have urged him to reach a settlement with
Jones, especially after reports surfaced that she had allegedly inquired about
becoming his girlfriend. 125 Reasonable governors and presidents are expected to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Thus, negotiating an early settlement
with Jones could have served as legal-political damage control. Once Clinton's
advisors acknowledged that then-Governor Clinton was alone in a hotel room with a
woman, escorted there by an officer who appeared to be an agent for the
conspicuously sexy governor, it was time to reach a legal-political settlement.1
26
If the Bush Administration fully complies with the subpoenas requested by
Congress, it would not be a surprise to find that the White House had an early
honeymoon with Enron and the energy industry. Now that the honeymoon is
122. Michael Isikoff, et al., Clinton Hires Lawyer as Sexual Harassment Suit is Threatened, Former
State Employee in Arkansas Alleges Improper Advance in 1991, WASH. POST, May 4, 1994, at Al, available at
1994 WL 2285170.
On Feb. 11, former Arkansas state clerical worker Paula Jones appeared at a Washington
news conference and accused Bill Clinton of making an unwanted and improper sexual
advance during a brief encounter in a Little Rock hotel room in 1991. Asked by reporters to
respond, White House aides said the story was untrue and described it as a cheap political
trick engineered by avowed Clinton enemy Cliff Jackson, who had helped arrange Jones's
news conference at a gathering of political conservatives. They said Clinton had no memory
of meeting the woman. Clinton's new attorney, Robert S. Bennett, said yesterday, "This
event, plain and simple, didn't happen." Clinton has retained Bennett as his personal attorney
to defend against a threatened lawsuit this week by Jones.
Id.
123. Id.
What began as a civil lawsuit against the President of the United States for alleged sexual
harassment eventually resulted in an impeachment trial of the President in the United States
Senate on two Articles of Impeachment for his actions during the course of this lawsuit and a
related criminal investigation being conducted by the Office of the Independent Counsel
("OIC"). The civil lawsuit was settled while on appeal from this Court's decision granting
summary judgment to defendants and the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of
Impeachment. Those proceedings having concluded, the Court now addresses the issue of
contempt on the part of the President first raised in footnote five of the Court's Memorandum
and Order of September 1, 1998.
Id.
124. Sandy Grady, Another Mini-Scandal for Clinton, BUFFALO NEWS, May 10, 1994, at C3, available
at 1994 WL 5017889.
125. Sharon LaFraniere, State Trooper Rebuts Jones's Sex Allegations; Clinton's Ex-Bodyguard Responds
in Rights Case, WASH. POST, June 11, 1994, at Al, available at 1994 WL 2291780.
126. Id.
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over, Congress and the American people are entitled to know whether the
American people paid for the honeymoon with an energy policy that favors big
business over the energy-consuming public. Although the White House may be
embarrassed by the nature of its past romance with the energy industry (and the
Enrons of the corporate world), this embarrassment does not authorize it to
impair a congressional investigation into the nature of that romance. In Watkins
v. United States,127 the Supreme Court clearly stated that Congress may probe
the federal executive to determine whether or not new laws are needed to
discourage the type of romance that may have existed between Enron and Vice
President Cheney's energy task force.
128
Congress's interests in exercising its power of contempt in the investigative
process are very different from its role in the impeachment process. 129 Congress's
contempt power is like that of a court because it protects the integrity of the
congressional investigation "while impeachment is a constitutional process in
which the proper [congressional] inquiry is the President's fitness to serve in
office." 130 Presented with this differentiation, the White House should defer to
Congress's use of its subpoena power concerning Enron documents by providing
full disclosure to avoid the political embarrassment that may be created by
Congress holding the President in contempt for failing to adequately provide
subpoenaed documents. Although the failure to provide subpoenaed documents to
Congress is probably not an impeachable offense, the President should be
reminded that "both congressional and judicial subpoenas are compulsory
documents enforceable with criminal sanctions." 131 If the President is found in
contempt of Congress because of a failure to adequately comply with a congressional
subpoena, he has committed a criminal offense. 132 President Bush would be unwise to
127. 354U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
128. Dunne, supra note 105.
129. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
130. Id.
131. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. Id.
Congress always has possessed the inherent power to punish witnesses who refuse to disclose
information. And since the enactment in 1857 of a statute making it a misdemeanor to refuse to
answer or to produce papers before Congress, the power of the courts has been an additional
sanction available to enforce a congressional request or subpoena.
Id. at 737-38. (footnotes omitted). See id. (citing the Act of January 24, 1857 which provided:
CHAP. XIX: An Act more effectually to enforce the Attendance of Witnesses on the Summons of
either House of Congress, and to compel them to discover Testimony. Be it enacted by the
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
[t]hat any person summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give
testimony or to produce papers upon any matter before either House, or any committee of either
House of Congress, who shall willfully make default, or who, appearing, shall refuse to answer
any question pertinent to the matter of inquiry in consideration before the House or committee
by which he shall be examined, shall in addition to the pains and penalties now existing, be
liable to indictment as and for a misdemeanor, in any court of the United States having
jurisdiction thereof, and on conviction, shall pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars and
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assume the risk of being found in contempt of Congress on the basis of a generic
interest in confidential presidential communications. Assuming such a risk "could
... engender protracted litigation"1 33 involving the President defending misdemeanor
criminal charges, President Bush's assumption of such risk invites an unnecessary
protracted political power struggle between the executive and legislative branches.
In theory, the President risks a possible twelve-month jail sentence and a possible
one-thousand-dollar fine for not adequately producing Enron-related documents.' 
34
Since 1932, Congress has not imprisoned anyone for contempt.1 35 It is unlikely that
Congress will find either President Bush or Vice President Cheney in contempt for
failure to produce all relevant Enron documents because each side is likely to reach
a compromise for their respective political self-interests. President Bush has
instructed members of his cabinet not to provide Congress with subpoenaed
documents.1 36 "Congress has cited cabinet members for contempt for refusing to
provide subpoenaed information.' 37 When Henry Kissinger, James Watt, and
Charles Duncan disregarded congressional subpoenas they were cited for contempt
of Congress. 138 The contempt citations were dismissed against the three after the
White House reached an accord with Congress by materially complying with the
subpoena.139 The White House should be very cautious about not complying with a
congressional request for documents because, in Jones v. Clinton, Chief Judge
Wright established the legal precedent of finding a President of the United States in
contempt in civil litigation.140 The message of Jones v. Clinton to Bush's White
House is that Congress's contempt power is not to be disregarded because "Congress
and the courts stand equal in their power to issue subpoenas and equal in their power to
enforce them with criminal sanctions.
14 1
not less than one hundred dollars, and suffer imprisonment in the common jail not less than one
month nor more than twelve months.)
2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). Section 192 of title 2 of the United States Code provides the present authority on the
issue of the refusal of a witness to testify or produce papers.
133. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 692 (stating that "the issue whether a President can be cited
for contempt could itself engender protracted litigation").
134. 2 U.S.C. § 192.
135. Workshop: Preliminary Information on Ethics Investigations, 11 J.L. & POL. 419, 424 (1995).
Congress has not ordered anyone imprisoned for contempt since 1932. Instead a committee
that wishes to punish a witness introduces a contempt resolution referring that person to the
full body of the House or Senate. If a simple majority votes its approval the matter is referred
to a U.S. Attorney who then prosecutes the individual for contempt of Congress. G. Gordon
Liddy was prosecuted for contempt in this manner, receiving a suspended six month sentence
for refusing to be sworn to testify before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee.





140. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
141. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 738.
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In Nixon v. Sirica,142 the court correctly stated that a congressional subpoena
issued to assist Congress's legislative initiative is at least entitled to the same
deference as a judicial subpoena issued to acquire information about a crime
because federal legislation immediately impacts over two hundred million
people. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which has been
studying Enron's financial disintegration since December 2001, is expected to
ask executives from Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase about the roles their banks
may have played in the Enron scandal. 143 "The Wall Street firms and Enron used
'accounting tricks' and overseas 'sham companies' to misstate Enron debt, keep
its credit rating high and polish its financial statements for investors, according to
congressional investigators."'
' 44
In an effort to prevent the type of accounting tricks used by Enron and
others in corporate America, the Senate passed an accounting reform bill,' 45 and
the House passed the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act.' 46 On July 25, 2002,
Congress passed legislation "designed to stamp out corporate and accounting
fraud and restore public confidence in the nation's financial markets."'' 47 One
pragmatic goal of the newly-passed legislation is to warn corporate chieftains
that Congress will not tolerate the kind of accounting scandals and allegations
of fraud that have brought about the demise of companies like Enron. 48 Even if
Congress does not exercise its power of contempt against President Bush for a
failure to adequately disclose the subpoenaed Enron records, the Bush
Administration should produce the records in order to assert its lack of
connections with Enron.
The White House needs some political separation from Enron as Enron is a
target for "[i]nvestor anger at having lost trillions of dollars in stock market
wealth."' 149 A failure by the Bush Administration to fully disclose all Enron-related
documents subpoenaed by Congress lends support to critics who accused President
Bush of being "slow to grasp the enormity"'150 of the Enron legal-political problem.
When Congress exercises its broad legislative powers to investigate Enron' 1 and
142. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
143. Edward Iwata, Did Banks Play Role in Enron Scandal? JP. Morgan Chase, Citigroup Execs Face
Questions, USA TODAY, July 23, 2002, at B 1, available at 2002 WL 4730371.
144. Id.
145. S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002).
146. H.R. 5118, 107th Cong. (2002).
147. Albert B. Crenshaw, Congress Sends Corporate, Accounting Fraud Bill to Bush, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, July 26, 2002, at A 17, available at 2002 WL 21888843.
148. Id.
149. Congress OKs Accounting Rules, CINCINNATI POST, July 26, 2002, at 2A, available at 2002 WL
6535350.
150. Id.
151. Chase, Citigroup Defend Practices/Shares Rebound as Banks Deny Disguising Loans, HOUST.
CHRON., July 25, 2002, at 4, available at 2002 WL 23211323.
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. on Wednesday defended itself against congressional allegations it
helped bankrupt energy trader Enron Corp. hide massive debts, boosting its shares and the
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corporate accounting scandals152 in order to protect the American public with
appropriate legislation, the White House must understand that it is not privileged to
engage in a game of executive concealment with Congress. A congressional
investigation of the White House for legislative purposes is similar to the discovery
process in a lawsuit.'53 Congress may compel the executive branch to reveal
whatever relevant facts it has unless the President demonstrates that disclosure
would impair the functions of the executive branch.
VI. LEGAL-POLITICAL TENSIONS UNDER THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE CREATED BY CONGRESSIONAL OR EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATIONS
IMPLICATE THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVILEGE NOT TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION
America's separation of powers doctrine was born out of a belief that the
political ambition of congressional representatives and presidents should be
checked by constitutional barriers that precluded either the President or Congress
from implementing its power plays without the cooperation of each other and the
Supreme Court. 54 James Madison once concluded that, in America, political
broader U.S. stock market .... J.P. Morgan executives spoke to Wall Street after U.S.
congressional investigators said J.P. Morgan and Citigroup for years helped Enron hide debt
that ultimately led to the energy trader's collapse. The banks also entered into Enron-style
financing deals with at least [ten] other unidentified companies, investigators said at hearings
on Tuesday.... Congressional investigators accused J.P. Morgan and Citigroup of lending
Enron billions of dollars via disguised commodity trades called prepays. With prepays,
money is paid in advance for future delivery of a commodity like oil or gas. Enron booked
proceeds from the transactions as cash flow but should have booked it as debt, investigators
said. J.P. Morgan executives said on Wednesday many financial institutions and other firms
use prepay transactions, and that Enron's obligations under the prepay transactions were
properly recorded as trading liabilities.
Id.
152. Congressional Panel Focuses on Banks' Role in Wake of Accounting Scandals, CARD NEWS, July
25, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9266981.
In the latest chapter in the ongoing saga of corporate accounting scandals, a Congressional
panel at our deadline were grilling bankers on their role in offering what government sources
say were loans by another name to collapsed energy giant Enron Corp. in the months before it
filed for bankruptcy protection.... The hearings will focus on the role of major financial
institutions in structuring transactions that had significant impact on Enron's financial
statements. Witnesses will include representatives from major financial institutions,
accounting and financial experts, and investigators from the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (PSI). Levin has issued over [sixty] subpoenas to members of the Board of
Directors and officers of Enron as well as to the Enron Corporation, Arthur Andersen and a
number of financial institutions. In addition, PSI staff members have reviewed over one
million pages of documents as part of their investigation into the collapse of Enron.
Id.
153. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. "A lawsuit is not a contest in concealment, and the
discovery process was established so that 'either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession."' Id. (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 130 (5th Cir. 1968), as quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
154. J. Richard Broughton, Paying Ambition's Debt: Can the Separation of Powers Tame the Impetuous
Vortex of Congressional Investigations?, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 797, 798 (2000).
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ambition should counterbalance political ambition in a democracy in order to
protect the freedom of American citizens. 155 Although Madison did not believe
that the federal legislature should have unlimited power, he was clearly of the
opinion that legislative power should outweigh executive power 56 because
legislators were presumed to be more in touch with the ordinary citizen.'57 While
Madison made an effective argument for a strong federal legislative branch,
Alexander Hamilton took the position that the federal executive branch should be
very powerful. 158 Both Madison and Hamilton realized that neither Congress nor
the President should be granted unrestricted power because giving either branch
too much unchecked power would invite abuse by the politically ambitious.
59
The struggle for political power between the three branches of the federal
government reaches its greatest level of constitutional intensity when Congress
engages in the process of investigating the President. 60 Congress may reach a
power play impasse with the President when the White House refuses to disclose
subpoenaed information. 16'
Historically, the first time a president refused to comply with a congressional
request for documents by specifically articulating the executive privilege theory
was in 1954. 162 Executive privilege "is the claim made by the executive branch of
immunity from congressional investigation and judicial procedures based on the
constitutional principle of separation of powers-and whether it's a right or a
ruse depends on the circumstances."'
' 63
American presidents have consistently resisted requests for documents
related to presidential communications, basing their resistance on the specific
theory of executive privilege. 64 Lloyd Cutler, who served as counsel to both
former Presidents Carter and Clinton, notes that battles between Congress and the
President for access to presidential communications have "been going on since
155. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)).
156. Id. at 799 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
157. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison)).
158. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
159. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton)).
160. Id. at 800.
161. Id. (citing MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 33-53 (1994), which "give[s] a number of historical examples of Congress invoking [its]
investigatory authority concerning the executive branch"). See Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in
a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 501-16
(1987) (providing some case histories of congressional demands for information from the executive branch, including
Congress's subpoenas of James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, in 1981 and Anne Gorsuch, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, in 1982).
162. Michael Kramer, W Took a While to Work Up "Outrage, " N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 24, 2002, at 6,
available at 2002 WL 3164644. The executive privilege was first invoked in 1954 when Senator Joseph
McCarthy investigated the Eisenhower administration. Id.
163. Id.
164. Tom Raum, Battle Over Cheney Contacts Could Be Risky for Bush, Polls Show Many Believe
White House Has Something to Hide in Enron Affair, THE RECORD (N.J.), Jan. 29, 2002, at A13, available at
2002 WL 4643881.
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George Washington refused congressional demands for information on treaty
negotiations."
' 165
Presidents typically maintain the separation of powers right not to disclose
requested documents under the self-evident truth of executive exemption. A
President's exemption from a congressional request for information is subject to
attack when it is based on "executive privilege [because executive privilege] is
not as clear-cut as other legal privileges such as those between... attorney and
client and remains open to political as well as judicial interpretation.' 66 Because
former Presidents Nixon and Clinton made the express use of executive privilege
politically unpopular as a basis of denying Congress requested information,
Presidents in the post-Nixon era have generally used phrases other than executive
privilege to request a presidential exemption from a congressional demand for
information. 167 In most situations, quarrels about denying Congress access to
information in the White House's possession "have resulted in compromise and
settlement,"' 168  allowing the court to avoid refereeing these constitutionally
permissible power battles.
When the battle between the President and Congress reaches a constitutional
impasse concerning the President's refusal to release subpoenaed information,
one legal consequence of the President's refusal to disclose the information is a
contempt of Congress citation under the rationale of Jones v. Clinton. The
Supreme Court has not decided whether the President can avoid a direct request
for disclosure of information from Congress for legislative purposes under a
generic claim of executive privilege.' 69 It is doubtful that the President can be
successful in resisting a congressional request for information relative to its
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Naftali Bendavid, Congress to Sue for Cheney Papers, CHI. TRIt., Jan. 31, 2002, available at 2002
WL 11691060.
Although the White House has chosen not to claim executive privilege, an action that now
carries a whiff of scandal, the issues surrounding executive privilege lurk behind the arguments
on both sides. The case is likely to mirror previous occasions when an administration claimed
executive privilege as investigators sought to override it. The most famous of these cases erupted
in 1974 when President Richard Nixon asserted executive privilege to avoid turning over tapes
during the Watergate scandal.
Id.
168. Broughton, supra note 154, at 800.
169. Bendavid, supra note 167.
No one knows how that question will be decided. Stanley Brand, former counsel to the House of
Representatives, said the GAO should prevail. "It's not that big of a leap to say Congress can
overcome the privilege where it can demonstrate its need as it crafts legislation," Brand said.
Douglas Kmiec, dean of Catholic University law school, disagreed. In a criminal case, he said, a
person is on trial and faces possible imprisonment; Congress'[s] need for information as it
shapes laws pales in comparison. But the White House hopes the judge never decides the
executive privilege issue.
Id.
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legislative power without establishing that the disclosure would impair the
President's executive function under the United States v. Nixon standard., 70
The basic principle in United States v. Nixon is that, in either a civil or
criminal matter, the President may not deny information to another branch of
government unless the President establishes a basic separation of powers "need
to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets.'' If the
President fails to meet this narrow judicial standard of a military, diplomatic, or
national security justification for executive privilege, he is not permitted to
withhold information from Congress. 7 2 Accordingly, the President also assumes
the risk of contempt of Congress under Jones v. Clinton.
Professor J. Richard Broughton states that, when the President clashes with
Congress by misusing the executive privilege and refuses to provide Congress
with requested subpoenaed information, "Congress must proceed with impeachment"
and not a contempt proceeding. 173 Unlike Professor Broughton, I believe that
when the President fails to comply with a congressional subpoena for
information, Congress is not required to impeach the President to demonstrate its
dissatisfaction with the President's action. As an alternative to invoking the
impeachment process against the President for his bad faith failure to comply
with a congressional subpoena issued for proper legislative purposes, I postulate
that "Congress [may] file a civil action to enforce a subpoena against the
President."' 174 The congressional civil action to enforce its subpoena renders the
President liable for contempt of Congress under the rationale of Jones v. Clinton.
Any conclusion that a judicial civil action to enforce a congressional subpoena
against the President "would differ from a scenario in which a private party or a
lower executive official is subject to contempt"'175 is inconsistent with Jones v.
Clinton.
Under the rationale of Jones v. Clinton, the President must justify his refusal
to provide sensitive Article 11176 information to another branch of the federal
government under the narrow executive impairment exceptions articulated in
United States v. Nixon 177 in order to escape a court's routine contempt power.
The White House could avoid Congress's routine contempt power by making a
reasonable argument that disclosing Vice President Cheney's energy task force
170. 418 U.S. at 706.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Broughton, supra note 154, at 822. "[Ilf Congress believes that the President is acting not to protect
legitimate constitutional prerogatives, but instead has abused his power to assert the privilege, Congress must
proceed with impeachment, rather than a judicial proceeding such as a civil suit for injunctive or declaratory
relief, or a contempt prosecution." Id.
174. Id. at 830.
175. Id.at830-31.
176. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. I (asserting that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.").
177. 418 U.S. at 706.
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documents would compromise President Bush's ability to wage the war on
terrorism. However, reasonable facts (and not a creature of someone's
imagination) must support the war on terrorism justification for executive
privilege. I concede that the President's failure to comply with the congressional
subpoena could be an impeachable offense in legal theory, but, in political reality,
Congress is unlikely to impeach a popular President like Bush, 178 even if Congress
could prove a bad faith failure to comply with its subpoena. I believe Congress has
the power to find the President in criminal contempt of Congress without impeaching
him by the simple expedient of concluding that a presidential criminal misdemeanor
contempt violation is not an impeachable "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
'1 79
offense.
Professor Broughton asserts that finding a President in criminal contempt of
Congress is a mandatory impeachable offense under Article II, Section IV. 180
Congress may hold a President in criminal contempt of Congress for failing to
provide subpoenaed information under the broad Necessary and Proper Clause
power granted to it under Article I of the Constitution.18 1 Under the rationale of
Dunn,' when Congress demonstrates the necessity to conduct an investigation
of the President for legislative rather than political purposes, the President may
be subject to criminal contempt under the Necessary and Proper Clause for
legislative impairment under the separation of powers doctrine and not
impeached under Article 11.183 One must not forget that congressional and judicial
subpoenas are mandatory instruments "enforceable with criminal sanctions."
1 84
Congress has the intrinsic "power to punish witnesses who refuse to disclose
information" without a proper legal justification. 185 Since 1857, Congress has
also had federal statutory authority to seek the assistance of courts in enforcing
178. Corporate Scandals Take a Toll on Bush, His Popularity Numbers Dip as the Stock Market Takes a
Dive, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 17, 2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL 23815882.
It was about the time President Bush started speaking about corporate accountability last
week that the stock market began a decline.... A poll published in today's Washington Post
found nearly [three] out of [four] voters approve of Bush's performance-an astoundingly
high rate unchanged from last month. However, the Zogby Poll found Bush's positive rating
at [sixty-two] percent, down seven points from last month, while his negatives rose [ten]
percentage points to [thirty-eight] percent.
Id.
179. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (stating that "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
180. Broughton, supra note 154, at 832-33.
181. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (setting forth the following language: "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
182. 19 U.S. at 220-24.
183. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
184. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 737.
185. Id.
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the law, making a failure to answer or produce papers before Congress a criminal
misdemeanor. 186
In Jones v. Clinton, the federal district court considered holding President
Clinton in criminal contempt of court because of Clinton's attempt to mislead
Jones about the sexual nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky.187 Chief
Judge Wright's opinion suggests that, under the proper set of facts, a sitting
President could be held in criminal contempt by a federal court without violating
the Constitution's separation of powers mandate. 88 However, Chief Judge
Wright found President Clinton in civil contempt of court under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) in order to avoid any constitutional issues that might
arise from finding the President in criminal contempt of court for his unofficial
conduct. 189 Chief Judge Wright was careful to note that "the question of whether
a President can be held in criminal contempt of court and subjected to criminal
penalties raises constitutional issues not addressed by the Supreme Court in the
Jones case."' 190
The rationale of United States v. Nixon supports the conclusion that the
President may be held in criminal contempt by either a federal court or Congress if
he asserts his executive privilege in bad faith in an attempt to withhold relevant
information from either a federal court or Congress. 191 Professor Todd Peterson
argues that Congress does not have the ability to hold the President in contempt of
Congress because doing so would violate the separation of powers doctrine by
interfering with the federal executive branch's prosecutorial discretion. 192 Professor
Peterson's argument should be rejected because his prosecutorial discretion
immunity theory is actually an assertion of generic executive privilege under
another name. The generic assertion of executive privilege in the name of the
common law prosecutorial discretion doctrine should be rejected under United
States v. Nixon when the President fails to articulate a sensitive Article II necessity
186. Id. at 737-38.
187. See 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 & n.21 (stating that "[u]nder 18 U.S.C. § 401, federal courts possess the
power to impose sanctions for criminal contempt committed in or near the presence of the court. When invoking
this power, courts must follow one of two procedures set forth in [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 42.").
188. Id. at 1133-34.
189. Id. at 1134 n.22.
190. Id.
191. See id. (stating that "[c]riminal contempt, however, 'is a crime in the ordinary sense').
192. See Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 566 (1991) (asserting that:
[a]lthough there is no general agreement concerning modem separation-of-powers theory, the cases
consistently reflect a suspicion of statutes that concentrate authority within one branch and a much
greater tolerance of statutes that diffuse authority at the expense of government accountability. This
theme is particularly important in the context of criminal prosecutions, in which divided authority is
an essential part of the constitutional structure. The proper focus of the constitutional analysis is not
whether congressionally mandated prosecutions would interfere with the power of the executive
branch, but whether they would grant Congress unchecked power.).
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for not complying with a subpoena issued by a court or Congress. 193 A President's
failure to demonstrate a "need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national
security secrets"'' 94 makes the argument that a substantial interest in prosecutorial
discretion under the separation of powers theory prevents Congress from exercising
its criminal or civil contempt powers against the President unacceptable.
The Bush Administration's argument that its executive privilege gives it the
right not to disclose papers that may highlight Enron's role in Vice President
Cheney's energy task force is not doing well in the federal courts.195 The White
House has historically engaged in battles with Congress about whether it is
obligated to disclose information under separation of powers principles.' 96 But,
under relevant federal law, the President's team now faces judicial challenge
from private interest groups about public policy issues. 197 If the White House is
unable to deny information to the Judicial Watch, a private organization with a
reputation as a watchdog for corruption, it is unlikely to convince a court that it is
entitled to keep Enron documents from congressional investigators based on a
nonspecific assertion of executive power.198 Judge Sullivan correctly advised Justice
Department lawyers that a simple assertion of "executive privilege" is not a proper
basis for denying Judicial Watch access to the Enron documents.' 99 Judge Sullivan
warned Justice Department lawyers that it is inappropriate to conclude that the request
for Cheney's energy task force records is unconstitutional without demonstrating a
constitutional basis for that conclusion.2 °° The Justice Department's argument for
executive privilege failed to articulate a reasonable basis for its claim consistent with
United States v. Nixon's Article II executive function-impairment requirement.20'
Judge Sullivan rejected the Justice Department's argument that Cheney's task
force was not subject to relevant federal laws that exposed similar groups to
193. 418 U.S. at 706.
194. Id.
195. Lydia Adetunji, Court Blow to Cheney Over Enron Papers, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at P2,
available at 2002 WL 24874475.
196. See Peterson, supra note 192, at 568-69 (noting that "[d]isputes over congressional access to executive
branch documents date from the beginnings of the republic itself, but, until recently, none had escalated to the
contempt stage.").
197. Adetunji, supra note 195 (explaining that:
White House efforts to block the release of documents that could reveal whether Enron
exerted influence over an energy task force headed by Vice-President Dick Cheney suffered a
setback ... when a federal judge rejected its arguments. US district court judge, Emmet
Sullivan, said that, unless government lawyers provided specific reasons to keep the records
under wraps, he would approve the fact-finding moves made by Judicial Watch, a corruption
"watchdog," and the Sierra Club environmental group. Both groups are trying to find out
whether US energy policy shaped by the task force and its individual members was




201. 418 U.S. at 706.
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public scrutiny.2 °2 Of course, once Congress realizes that the White House is not
entitled to keep the Enron documents from private citizens under a generic
assertion of executive privilege, it has no incentive to compromise and withdraw
its subpoena for the documents.2 °3
The Judicial Watch litigation raises at least six possible congressional treatments
for the failure of the President to adequately comply with a subpoena of Vice
President Cheney's energy task force papers. First, Congress may simply avoid a
separation of powers dispute with the President by allowing private litigants to use
the federal courts to enforce a right of public access to the Enron documents.
Second, if Judicial Watch is successful in obtaining the Enron documents from the
White House through civil litigation, Congress's legal incentive to hold the
executive branch in contempt for failing to comply with its subpoena for the
information will not diminish. Third, Congress may wish to hold the executive
branch in contempt for failing to obey its subpoena of the energy task force
records, even if Judicial Watch is successful in gaining access to those documents
through the judicial process. Fourth, if Congress does not want the executive
branch to ignore its subpoena power with weak arguments of executive privilege, it
may seek to hold the President in contempt of Congress, regardless of the outcome
of Judicial Watch's effort to secure the task force records. Fifth, if Judicial Watch
is successful in obtaining the energy task force records because a federal court
rejects the President's executive privilege claim, its success strengthens Congress's
hand for finding the President in contempt for asserting the executive privilege in
bad faith. Sixth, if private litigation is successful and the energy task force records
are made accessible to the public, it may be politically unwise to find the President
in contempt of Congress for failing to comply with the subpoena because it might
appear that Congress is simply harassing the President for political purposes.
Congress must use its contempt power against the President very wisely in order to
avoid giving presidential contempt power a bad name similar to the bad reputation
the executive privilege concept earned in the court of public opinion. 0 4
202. Adetunji, supra note 195.
203. See generally Peterson, supra note 192, at 571 (stating that:
Watergate marked a watershed for the use of congressional contempt power against the
executive branch. Beginning in the mid-1970s, congressional committees turned with increasing
frequency to the threat of contempt of Congress to enforce demands for information from the
executive branch. In 1975, for example, the House Select Committee on Intelligence cited
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for contempt of Congress after he failed to produce
subpoenaed classified documents relating to U.S. intelligence operations. The Committee
withdrew its recommendation for contempt sanctions once the White House and the Committee
reached a compromise, which the committee chair characterized as "substantial compliance"
with the subpoena. Although Congress repeatedly resorted to threats of contempt sanctions to
force compliance with congressional subpoenas, it was not until the Reagan administration that a
contempt citation passed beyond a committee to a full vote in the House or Senate.) (footnotes
omitted).
204. Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 1069, 1071 (1999) (noting that:
President Richard M. Nixon gave executive privilege a bad name, however, when he invoked
2002 / The Rise and Fall of Enron
VII. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD AVOID ASSERTING THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
TO DENY DISCLOSING INFORMATION TO CONGRESS UNLESS THE
PRESIDENT SPECIFICALLY ARTICULATES HOW THE DISCLOSURE
WOULD IMPAIR THE PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE POWER
Because the American presidency is a special institution, it deserves a great
deal of respect from all Americans, including President Bush.20 5 Because of the
Nixon taint, a President does a great legal-political disservice to his office by
lightly invoking the executive privilege concept as a defense to routine requests
for information by Congress that do not impair his role under the Constitution.2 6
A President invoking executive privilege in a battle with Congress about access
to information in the post-Watergate era is presumed to be hiding something,
20 7
especially when he asserts generic executive privilege without identifying the
Article II "military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets" required
under United States v. Nixon.
208
Unless President Bush is clearly convinced that executive level military,
diplomatic, or national security interests are a basis for not adequately providing
Congress with subpoenaed information, he should not invoke a discredited
executive privilege defense. 20 9 A decision by President Bush to use executive
privilege to deny Congress or the public access to the Cheney energy task force
documents is not a smart legal-political move.
these legitimate defenses in a circumstance where clearly the President was trying to conceal
White House wrongdoing. His actions and the timely publication of scholar Raoul Berger's
book, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth, destroyed the consensus that executive
privilege is legitimate. Many began to question whether the President ever could legitimately
make such a claim. Every President who has asserted executive privilege since has been
subject to unflattering characterizations that he is engaging in Nixonian tactics to conceal and
deceive.).
205. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 698-99 (1997) (explaining that:
As Justice Jackson has pointed out, the Presidency concentrates executive authority "in a
single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public
hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any
others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear.". . . We have, in short, long
recognized the "unique position in the constitutional scheme" that this office occupies.)
(citations omitted).
206. Rozell, supra note 204, at 1072 (asserting that:
post-Watergate events make clear, there is a need to reestablish the legitimacy of executive
privilege and an understanding of its proper scope and limits in our constitutional system.
These goals cannot be achieved through statutory law, but rather, through a return to the
constitutional Framers' understanding of the separation of powers.).
207. Edwin Chen & Henry Weinstein, The Nation and the Fall of Enron, Cheney Faces Suit Over
Energy Panel Politics: The Vice President Claims Legal Privilege to Conceal Who Helped Him Form Policy,
L.A. TMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at A 1, available at 2002 WL 2450457.
208. 418 U.S. at 706.
209. Rozell, supra note 204, at 1069.
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The White House['s] readiness to go to court rather than release details of
Vice President Dick Cheney's meetings with energy officials poses a
political risk for President Bush and his party. Polls show many Americans
think the administration is hiding something about its dealings with Enron,
and a court fight could help drive that impression home.2 1°
For most Americans, a refusal to disclose the energy task force papers simply
summons memories "of Watergate and President Richard Nixon's attempt to
use" executive privilege to interfere with a lawful investigation.21' The Bush
Administration should abandon any claim to executive privilege involving the
Cheney task force because it appears that the refusal to disclose the information
is based on potential White House embarrassment caused by its close ties to
Enron.2 12 The Bush Administration should follow the lead of President George
Washington and recognize that an attempt to avoid a politically embarrassing
connection with Enron is not a proper basis for invoking executive privilege. 213 It
is indeed striking that the Bush Administration would consider engaging
Congress "in an unprecedented courtroom battle over whether" the GAO is
entitled to the names of industry representatives and other individuals who met
with Vice President Cheney's energy task force.214 Cheney's claim that he is
entitled to refuse to disclose the information because of constitutional principle
215
is simply not supported by the rationale of United States v. Nixon. Some White
House aides now concede, in private conversations, that Congress's demand for
the energy task force documents is "unremarkable. 216 In 1992, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, with significant protest, accommodated requests from Congress to
disclose the names of the individuals who met with her health care task force.217
Professor Rozell's excellent article appears to support the conclusion that
restoring a good reputation for executive privilege demands that the Bush
Administration articulate a justification more compelling than an attempt to avoid
the appearance of personal or political connections with corporate scandals
210. Tom Raum, Cheney-Enron Links Could Harm GOP, AP ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2002, available at 2002
WL 11684833.
211. Rozell, supra note 204, at 1069.
212. Raum, supra note 210.
213. Rozell, supra note 204, at 1070.
Washington's actions are particularly noteworthy because the nation's first President was
very conscious of the fact that everything he did established a precedent for the office. At no
point did he believe that a President could withhold information to protect himself from
politically embarrassing information or to cover-up conversations about potential wrongdoing
in the White House.
Id. (citation omitted).
214. Susan Page, Corporate Credentials Weigh Down Bush's Team, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2002, at B 1,




2002 / The Rise and Fall of Enron
created by the Enrons of the world.2t 8 The Bush Administration, like the Clinton
Administration, will only further discredit the executive privilege concept and
Bush's legacy2 19 by asserting the privilege in an effort to avoid the political
baggage associated with being perceived as being too friendly with big business in
general, and Enron in particular. 220 "The Cheney [Enron] case bears an eerie
resemblance to a 1993 case filed against the health-care task force of former First
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton" 221 and the Clinton Administration's unconvincing
use of executive privilege. If the Bush-Cheney team would like to avoid any future
comparison to the constitutional abuse of executive privilege by Presidents Nixon
and Clinton,222 I recommend the team not assert executive privilege unless there is
reasonable necessity to protect "military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets. 223
218. Rozell, supra note 204, at 1123-24. (explaining that, in order
[flor the White House position to have prevailed, Clinton needed to make a compelling
argument that the public interest would somehow suffer from the release of information about
White House discussions over the Lewinsky investigation. Not only had he failed to do so,
for months he even refused to answer basic questions as to whether he had formally invoked
the privilege. Once Judge Johnson ruled against Clinton, the White House dropped its flawed
claim of executive privilege. In an obvious face-saving gesture, White House counsel Charles
Ruff declared victory because Judge Johnson, in ruling against the President, had nonetheless
upheld the legitimacy of the principle of executive privilege and therefore had preserved this
presidential power for Clinton's successors. The doctrine of executive privilege certainly did
not need this kind of help.) (footnote omitted).
219. See id. at 1124 (stating that "there is little evidence from this episode to suggest that the Clinton
White House undertook this drawn-out battle merely to make a principled stand on executive privilege. All
evidence to date suggests that Clinton used executive privilege to frustrate and delay the investigation").
220. See Page, supra note 214. "When he took office, President Bush counted his corporate credentials
and those held by his top aides as assets, evidence of an administration that would bring businesslike efficiency
to government. Now, after a series of corporate scandals, those business backgrounds seem more like
liabilities." Id.
221. Bendavid, supra note 167.
222. Rozell, supra note 204, at 1125.
223. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
